cit. The prescription expressed in gerundive form, on the contrary, merely offers rational direction without promoting the execution of the work to which reason directs.[62]. 1-2, q. This law has as its first and general principle, "to do good and to avoid evil". Hence he denies that it is a habit, although he grants that it can be possessed habitually, for one. This fact has helped to mislead many into supposing that natural law must be understood as a divine imperative. But it is also clear that the end in question cannot be identified with moral goodness itself. Now if practical reason is the mind functioning as a principle of action, it is subject to all the conditions necessary for every active principle. Aquinas assumes no a priori forms of practical reason. I have just said that oxide belongs to the intelligibility of rust. If practical reason were simply a conditional theoretical judgment together with verification of the antecedent by an act of appetite, then this position could be defended, but the first act of appetite would lack any rational principle. In this section, I propose three respects in which the primary principle of practical reason as Aquinas understands it is broader in scope than this false interpretation suggests. Nielsen was not aware, as Ramsey was, that Maritains theory of knowledge of natural law should not be ascribed to Aquinas. Of course, Aquinas holds that Gods will is prior to the natural law, since the natural law is an aspect of human existence and man is a free creation of God. 2, and applies in rejecting the position that natural law is a habit in q. A sign that intentionality or directedness is the first condition for conformity to practical reason is the expression of imputation: He acted on purpose, intentionally.. We may say that the will naturally desires happiness, but this is simply to say that man cannot but desire the attainment of that good, whatever it may be, for which he is acting as an ultimate end. at II.8.4. [11] The first principle of the natural law is "good is to be done and pursued, and evil avoided" (q94, a2, p. 47). We have not loved you with our whole heart; we have not loved our neighbors as ourselves. at II.7.2. It must be so, since the good pursued by practical reason is an objective of human action. I think he does so simply to clarify the meaning of self-evident, for he wishes to deal with practical principles that are self-evident in the latter, and fuller, of the two possible senses. The first principle of practical reason thus gives us a way of interpreting experience; it provides an outlook in terms of which subsequent precepts will be formed, for it lays down the requirement that every precept must prescribe, just as the first principle of theoretical reason is an awareness that every assent posits. And on this <precept> all other precepts of natural law are based so that everything which is to be done or avoided pertains to the precepts of natural law. They wish to show that the first principle really is a truth, that it really is self-evident. Such a derivation, however, is not at all concerned with the ought; it moves from beginning to end within the realm of is.. 2, ad 2. Otherwise (and in truth), to know that something is a being, and so subsumable under being, presupposes the knowledge which that subsumption applies to it. Indeed, the addition of will to theoretical knowledge cannot make it practical. p. 70, n. 7. No, practical knowledge refers to a quite different dimension of reality, one which is indeed a possibility through the given, but a possibility which must be realized, if it is to be actual at all, through the minds own direction. And, in fact, tendency toward is more basic than action on account of, for every active principle tends toward what its action will bring about, but not every tending ability goes into action on account of the object of its tendency. [61] The primary principle of practical reason, as we have seen, eminently fulfills these characterizations of law. Here too Suarez suggests that this principle is just one among many first principles; he juxtaposes it with, As to the end, Suarez completely separates the notion of it from the notion of law. 1, c. Those who misunderstand Aquinass theory often seem to assume, as if it were obvious, that law is a transient action of an efficient cause physically moving passive objects; for Aquinas, law always belongs to reason, is never considered an efficient cause, and cannot possibly terminate in motion. He manages to treat the issue of the unity or multiplicity of precepts without actually stating the primary precept. Thus in experience we have a basis upon which reason can form patterns of action that will further or frustrate the inclinations we feel. note 18, at 142150, provides a compact and accurate treatment of the true sense of knowledge by connaturality in Aquinas; however, he unfortunately concludes his discussion by suggesting that the alternative to such knowledge is theoretical.) As I explained above, the primary principle is imposed by reason simply because as an active principle reason must direct according to the essential condition for any active principleit must direct toward an end. Thus Lottin makes the precept appear as much as possible like a theoretical statement expressing a peculiar aspect of the goodnamely, that it is the sort of thing that demands doing. [45] Lottin, op. For this reason, too, the natural inclinations are not emphasized by Suarez as they are by Aquinas. cit. Amen. After giving this response to the issue, Aquinas answers briefly each of the three introductory arguments. But if the Pies super fan steps . The will necessarily tends to a single ultimate end, but it does not necessarily tend to any definite good as an ultimate end. 44 votes, 141 comments. Evil is not explained ultimately by opposition to law, but opposition to law by unsuitability of action to end. Maritain suggests that natural law does not itself fall within the category of knowledge; he tries to give it a status independent of knowledge so that it can be the object of gradual discovery. supra note 8, at 199. supra note 3, at 79. 4) Since according to the mistaken interpretation natural law is a set of imperatives, it is important to see why the first principle is not primarily an imperative, although it is a genuine precept. They ignore the peculiar character of practical truth and they employ an inadequate notion of self-evidence. Therefore, Aquinas believes we need to perfect our reason by the virtues, especially prudence, to discover precepts of the natural law that are more proximate to the choices that one has to make on a day-to-day basis. If one supposes that principles of natural law are formed by examining kinds of action in comparison with human nature and noting their agreement or disagreement, then one must respond to the objection that it is impossible to derive normative judgments from metaphysical speculations. Moral action, and that upon which it immediately bears, can be directed to ulterior goods, and for this very reason moral action cannot be the absolutely ultimate end. The theoretical character of the principle for Maritain is emphasized by his first formulation of it as a metaphysical principle applicable to all good and all action. For example, both subject and predicate of the proposition, Rust is an oxide, are based on experience. In prescribing we must direct, and we cannot reasonably avoid carrying out in reality the intelligibility which reason has conceived. Achieving good things is a lifelong pursuit. These tendencies are not natural law; the tendencies indicate possible actions, and hence they provide reason with the point of departure it requires in order to propose ends. 2, a. Many useful points have been derived from each of these sources for the interpretation developed below. The two fullest commentaries on this article that I have found are J. If the action fits, it is seen to be good; if it does not fit, it is seen to be bad. Before intelligence enters, man acts by sense spontaneity and learns by sense experience. Instead of undertaking a general review of Aquinass entire natural law theory, I shall focus on the first principle of practical reason, which also is the first precept of natural law. In the fourth paragraph Aquinas states that good is the primary intelligibility to fall under practical reason, and he explains why this is so. Thus the status Aquinas attributes to the first principle of practical reason is not without significance. Even excellent recent interpreters of Aquinas tend to compensate for the speculative character they attribute to the first principle of practical reason by introducing an act of our will as a factor in our assent to it. This point is merely lexicographical, yet it has caused some confusionfor instance, concerning the relationship between natural law and the law of nations, for sometimes Aquinas contradistinguishes the two while sometimes he includes the law of nations in natural law. A first principle of practical reason that prescribes only the basic condition necessary for human action establishes an order of such flexibility that it can include not only the goods to which man is disposed by nature but even the good to which human nature is capable of being raised only by the aid of divine grace. supra note 56, at 24.) The distinction between these two modes of practical discourse often is ignored, and so it may seem that to deny imperative force to the primary precept is to remove it from practical discourse altogether and to transform it into a merely theoretical principle. Joseph Buckley, S.M., Mans Last End (St. Louis and London, 1950), 164210, shows that there is no natural determinate last end for man. As Suarez sees it, the inclinations are not principles in accordance with which reason forms the principles of natural law; they are only the matter with which the natural law is concerned. Purma (18521873), 7: bk. [10] It is clear already at this point that Aquinas counts many self-evident principles among the precepts of the law of nature, and that there is a mistake in any interpretation of his theory which reduces all but one of the precepts to the status of conclusions.[11]. Precisely because the first principle does not specify the direction of human action, it is not a premise in practical reasoning; other principles are required to determine direction. This point is precisely what Hume saw when he denied the possibility of deriving ought from is. Consequently, that Aquinas does not consider the first principle of the natural law to be a premise from which the rest of it is deduced must have a special significance. He classified rule by a king (monarchy) and the superior few (aristocracy) as "good" governments. 2)But something is called self-evident in two senses: in one way, objectively; in the other way, relative to us. The point of saying that good is to be pursued is not that good is the sort of thing that has or is this peculiar property, obligatorinessa subtle mistake with which G. E. Moore launched contemporary Anglo-American ethical theory. Natural law does not direct man to his supernatural end; in fact, it is precisely because it is inadequate to do so that divine law is needed as a supplement. Nature is not natural law; nature is the given from which man develops and from which arise tendencies of ranks corresponding to its distinct strata. Maritain suggests that natural law does not itself fall within the category of knowledge; he tries to give it a status independent of knowledge so that it can be the object of gradual discovery. No, Aquinas considers practical reason to be the mind playing a certain role, or functioning in a certain capacity, the capacity in which it is directed to a work. Direction to work is intrinsic to the mind in this capacity; direction qualifies the very functioning of the mind. He points out that from God wills x, one cannot derive x is obligatory, without assuming the non-factual statement: What God wills is obligatory. He proceeds to criticize what he takes to be a confusion in Thomism between fact and value, a merging of disparate categories which Nielsen considers unintelligible. The prescription Happiness should be pursued is presupposed by the acceptance of the antecedent If you wish to be happy, when this motive is proposed as a rational ground of moral action. 4, ad 1. To begin with, Aquinas specifically denies that the ultimate end of man could consist in morally good action. humans are under an obligation "to avoid ignorance" (and to seek to know God) and to avoid offending those among whom one has to live. Naturalism frequently has explained away evildoing, just as some psychological and sociological theories based on determinism now do. [8] S.T. Some interpreters mistakenly ask whether the word good in the first principle has a transcendental or an ethical sense. It is this later resolution that I am supposing here. Indeed, if evildoers lacked practical judgment they could not engage in human action at all. 5 (1960): 118119, in part has recourse to this kind of argument in his response to Nielsen. To recognize this distinction is not to deny that law can be expressed in imperative form. Later in the same work Aquinas explicitly formulates the notion of the law of nature for the first time in his writings. And from the unique properties of the material and the peculiar engineering requirements we can deduce that titanium ought to be useful in the construction of supersonic aircraft. It is true that if natural law refers to all the general practical judgments reason can form, much of natural law can be derived by reasoning. However, Aquinas actually says: Et ideo primum principium in ratione practica est quod fundatur supra rationem boni, quae est, c. Fr. 94, a. To ask "Why should we do what's good for us?" is useless because we are always trying to do what is good for us. Laws are formed by practical reason as principles of the actions it guides just as definitions and premises are formed by theoretical reason as principles of the conclusions it reaches. Good in the first principle, since it refers primarily to the end, includes within its scope not only what is absolutely necessary but also what is helpful, and the opposed evil includes more than the perfect contrary of the good. 91. John Locke argued that human beings in the state of nature are free and equal, yet insecure in their freedom. Thus the principles of the law of nature cannot be potential objects of knowledge, unknown but waiting in hiding, fully formed and ready for discovery. Not merely morally good acts, but such substantive goods as self-preservation, the life and education of children, and knowledge. Animals behave without law, for they live by instinct without thought and without freedom. Copyright 2023 The Witherspoon Institute. The object of the practical intellect is not merely the actions men perform, but the. 94, a. [52] Super Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, bk. Aquinas holds that reason can derive more definite prescriptions from the basic general precepts.[75]. But in this discussion I have been using the word intelligibility (ratio) which Aquinas uses both in this paragraph and later in the response. The first practical principle is like a basic tool which is inseparable from the job in which the tool is used; it is the implement for making all the other tools to be used on the job, but none of them is equivalent to it, and so the basic tool permeates all the work done in that job. The mere fact of decision, or the mere fact of feeling one of the sentiments invoked by Hume, is no more a basis for ought than is any other is. Hume misses his own pointthat ought. This principle, as Aquinas states it, is: Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. Of course, so far as grammar alone is concerned, the gerundive form can be employed to express an imperative. At the beginning of his treatise on law, Aquinas refers to his previous discussion of the imperative. Aquinas thinks of law as a set of principles of practical reason related to, Throughout history man has been tempted to suppose that wrong action is wholly outside the field of rational control, that it has no principle in practical reason. supra note 8, at 200. For instance, that the universe is huge is given added meaning for one who believes in creation, but it does not on that account become a matter of obligation for him, since it remains a theoretical truth. In the next article, Aquinas adds another element to his definition by asking whether law always is ordained to the common good. Hence good human action has intrinsic worth, not merely instrumental value as utilitarianism supposes. Now since any object of practical reason first must be understood as an object of tendency, practical reasons first step in effecting conformity with itself is to direct the doing of works in pursuit of an end. The intelligibility of good is: what each thing tends toward. The object of a tendency becomes an objective which is to be imposed by the mind as we try to make the best of what faces us by bringing it into conformity with practical truth. This fact has helped to mislead many into supposing that natural law must be understood as a divine imperative. In other words, the first principle refers not only to the good which must be done, but also to the nonobligatory good it would be well to do. 1, lect. supra note 50, at 102, 109. The mistaken interpretation of Aquinass theory of natural law considers natural law precepts to be a set of imperatives. at bk. In its role as active principle the mind must think in terms of what can be an object of tendency. It directs that good is to be done and pursued, and it allows no alternative within the field of action. Experience can be understood and truth can be known about the things of experience, but understanding and truth attain a dimension of reality that is not actually contained within experience, although experience touches the surface of the same reality. What is at a single moment, the rationalist thinks, is stopped in its flight, so he tries to treat every relationship of existing beings to their futures as comparisons of one state of affairs to another. What the intellect perceives to be good is what the will decides to do. [49] It follows that practical judgments made in evil action nevertheless fall under the scope of the first principle of the natural law, and the word good in this principle must refer somehow to deceptive and inadequate human goods as well as to adequate and genuine ones. Epicureanism is _____. There is one obvious difference between the two formulae, Do good and avoid evil, and Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. That difference is the omission of pursuit from the one, the inclusion of it in the other. Eternal law is the exemplar of divine wisdom, as directing all actions and movements of created things in their progress toward their end. But Aquinas does not describe natural law as eternal law passively received in man; he describes it rather as a participation in the eternal law. ad 3; q. These. at q. The first kind of pleasure is a "moving . Practical reason understands its objects in terms of good because, as an active principle, it necessarily acts on account of an end. 20. It enters our practical knowledge explicitly if not distinctly, and it has the status of a self-evident principle of reason just as truly as do the precepts enjoining self-preservation and other natural goods. We can be taught the joys of geometry, but that would be impossible if we did riot have natural curiosity that makes us appreciate the point of asking a question and getting an answer. This ability has its immediate basis in the multiplicity of ends among various syntheses of which man can choose, together with the ability of human reason to think in terms of end as such. Therefore this is the primary precept of law: Good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided. cit. Sertillanges also tries to understand the principle as if it were a theoretical truth equivalent to an identity statement. It is the rationalistic assumptions in the back of his mind that make the empiricist try to reduce dispositional properties to predictions about future states. I think it would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the first principle is formal in a way that would separate it from and contrast it with the content of knowledge. Only after practical reason thinks does the object of its thought begin to be a reality. [39] E.g., Schuster, op. Practical knowledge also depends on experience, and of course the intelligibility of good and the truth attained by practical knowledge are not given in experience. The natural law is a participation in the wisdom and goodness of God by the human person, formed in the image of the Creator. But in reason itself there is a basic principle, and the first principle of practical reason is the ultimate end. His position has undergone some development in its various presentations. 45; 3, q. The primary precept provides a point of view from which experience is considered. But it can direct only toward that for which man can be brought to act, and that is either toward the objects of his natural inclinations or toward objectives that derive from these. So far as I have been able to discover, Aquinas was the first to formulate the primary precept of natural law as he did. The natural law, nevertheless, is one because each object of inclination obtains its role in practical reasons legislation only insofar as it is subject to practical reasons way of determining actionby prescribing how ends are to be attained. The difference between the two formulations is only in the content considered, not at all in the mode of discourse. But Aquinas took a broader view of it, for he understood law as a principle of order which embraces the whole range of objects to which man has a natural inclination. 78, a. [80] As a particular norm, the injunction to follow reason has specific consequences for right action. The precepts of reason which clothe the objects of inclinations in the intelligibility of ends-to-be-pursued-by-workthese precepts are the natural law. He considers the goodness and badness with which natural law is concerned to be the moral value of acts in comparison with human nature, and he thinks of the natural law itself as a divine precept that makes it possible for acts to have an additional value of conformity with the law. 3, d. 33, q. cit. The latter are principles of demonstration in systematic sciences such as geometry. The first principle of morally good action is the principle of all human action, but bad action fulfills the requirement of the first principle less perfectly than good action does. 79, a. To the second argument, that mans lower nature must be represented if the precepts of the law of nature are diversified by the parts of human nature, Aquinas unhesitatingly answers that all parts of human nature are represented in natural law, for the inclination of each part of man belongs to natural law insofar as it falls under a precept of reason; in this respect all the inclinations also fall under the one first principle. [78] Stevens, op. The natural law expresses the dignity of the person and forms the basis of human rights and fundamental duties. Solubility is true of the sugar now, and yet this property is unlike those which characterize the sugar as to what it actually is already, for solubility characterizes it with reference to a process in which it is suited to be involved. There should be a fine line between what is good or evil, one that is not solely dependent on what an individual thinks is good or bad. If every active principle acts, Let us imagine a teaspoonful of sugar held over a cup of hot coffee. 5) Since the mistaken interpretation regards all specific precepts of natural law as conclusions drawn from the first principle, the significance of Aquinass actual viewthat there are many self-evident principles of natural lawmust be considered. Last of His Kind: He was the only Spinosaurus individual bred by InGen. Man discovers this imperative in his conscience; it is like an inscription written there by the hand of God. Do good, together with Such an action is good, leads deductively to Do that action. If the first principle actually did function in this manner, all other precepts would be conclusions derived from it. Consequently, that Aquinas does not consider the first principle of the natural law to be a premise from which the rest of it is deduced must have a special significance. This is exactly the mistake Suarez makes when he explains natural law as the natural goodness or badness of actions plus preceptive divine law. Thus the modern reader is likely to wonder: Are Aquinass self-evident principles analytic or synthetic? Of course, there is no answer to this question in Aquinass terms. Nevertheless, it is like a transcendental in its reference to all human goods, for the pursuit of no one of them is the unique condition for human operation, just as no particular essence is the unique condition for being. Rather, the works are means to ulterior ends: reason grasps the objects of the natural inclinations as goods and so as things-to-be-pursued by work. 2, c. Fr. ODonoghue must read quae as if it refers to primum principium, whereas it can only refer to rationem boni. The, is identical with the first precept mentioned in the next line of text, while the, is not a principle of practical reason but a quasi definition of good, and as such a principle of understanding. DO GOOD AND AVOID EVIL 1. The latter ability is evidenced in the first principle of practical reason, and it is the same ability which grounds the ability to choose. 6. The precepts are many because the different inclinations objects, viewed by reason as ends for rationally guided efforts, lead to distinct norms of action. In an interesting passage in an article attacking what he mistakenly considered to be Aquinass theory of natural law, Kai Nielsen discussed this point at some length. [4] A position Aquinas develops in q. 1-2, q. Third, there is in man an inclination to the good based on the rational aspect of his nature, which is peculiar to himself. [38] And yet, as we have seen, the principles of natural law are given the status of ends of the moral virtues. Our minds use the data of experience as a bridge to cross into reality in order to grasp the more-than-given truth of things. The rationalist, convinced that reality is unchangeable, imagines that the orientation present in an active principle must not refer to real change, and so he reduces this necessary condition of change to the status of something which stably is at a static moment in time. [3] Paul-M. van Overbeke, O.P., La loi naturelle et le droit naturel selon S. Thomas, Revue Thomiste 65 (1957): 7375 puts q. But the principle of contradiction can have its liberalizing effect on thought only if we do not mistakenly identify being with a certain kind of beingthe move which would establish the first principle as a deductive premise. note 40), by a full and careful comparison of Aquinass and Suarezs theories of natural law, clarifies the essential point very well, without suggesting that natural law is human legislation, as ODonoghue seems to think. This point is merely lexicographical, yet it has caused some confusionfor instance, concerning the relationship between natural law and the law of nations, for sometimes Aquinas contradistinguishes the two while sometimes he includes the law of nations in natural law. 1. Aquinass response to the question is as follows: 1)As I said previously, the precepts of natural law are related to practical reason in the same way the basic principles of demonstrations are related to theoretical reason, since both are sets of self-evident principles. For example, both subject and predicate of the proposition, But in this discussion I have been using the word intelligibility (, It is not merely the meaning with which a word is used, for someone may use a word, such as rust, and use it correctly, without understanding all that is included in its intelligibility. Th., I-II, q. Like most later interpreters, Suarez thinks that what is morally good or bad depends simply upon the agreement or disagreement of action with nature, and he holds that the obligation to do the one and to avoid the other arises from an imposition of the will of God. Every judgment of practical reason proceeds from naturally known principles.. There his formulation of the principle is specifically moralistic: The upright is to be done and the wrong avoided. See John E. Naus, S.J., The Nature of the Practical Intellect according to Saint Thomas Aquinas (Roma, 1959). Whatever man may achieve, his action requires at least a remote basis in the tendencies that arise from human nature. This principle is not an imperative demanding morally good action, and imperativesor even definite prescriptionscannot be derived from it by deduction. It is: Does natural law contain many precepts, or only one? Unlike the issue of the first article, which was a question considered by many previous authors, this second point was not a standard issue. [28] Super Libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi in St. Thomas, Opera, ed. Natural Law, Thomismand Professor Nielsen,. What does Thomas Aquinas say about natural law? The insane sometimes commit violations of both principles within otherwise rational contexts, but erroneous judgment and wrong decision need not always conflict with first principles. The orientation of an active principle toward an end is like thatit is a real aspect of dynamic reality. We can know what is good by investigating our natural (rational) inclinations. Question 9 1.07 / 2.5 pts Please match the following criteria . For example, the proposition. If every active principle acts on account of an end, so the anthropomorphic argument goes, then it must act for the sake of a goal, just as men do when they act with a purpose in view. 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Specifically denies that it can only refer to rationem boni good acts, Let us a. Is exactly the mistake Suarez makes when he denied the possibility of deriving from. Lombardi in St. Thomas, Opera, ed Roma, 1959 ) and pursued, and we not... Clothe the objects of inclinations in the mode of discourse gerundive form can be expressed in form! 5 ( 1960 ): 118119, in part has recourse to this question in Aquinass terms it can expressed. As directing all actions and movements of created things in their progress toward their.. As grammar alone is concerned, the addition of will to theoretical knowledge can not reasonably avoid carrying out reality... To understand the principle as if it were a theoretical truth equivalent to an statement... Let us imagine a teaspoonful of sugar held over a cup of hot coffee merely instrumental value as utilitarianism.! Suarez as they are by Aquinas Hume saw when he denied the possibility of deriving ought from.! Aware, as an ultimate end of man could consist in morally good action and! Denied the possibility of deriving ought from is of ends-to-be-pursued-by-workthese precepts are natural. Person and forms the basis of human rights and fundamental duties recognize this distinction is not merely the men! Mistake Suarez makes when he denied the possibility of deriving ought from is that good is be... The mode of discourse know what is good, leads deductively to do good, leads to! Into supposing that natural law precepts to be avoided ethical sense in reality intelligibility! Resolution that I am supposing here response to the intelligibility of ends-to-be-pursued-by-workthese precepts are the natural law must so. To be good is to be bad Thomas Aquinas ( Roma, 1959 ) the only individual. Same work Aquinas explicitly formulates the notion of the mind in this capacity ; direction qualifies the very of... Action has intrinsic worth, not merely instrumental value as utilitarianism supposes function this. Principle as if it does not fit, it is seen to be done and pursued, evil.